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Valuation and Efficient 
Allocation of GSM 
Export Credit Guarantees 
Matthew A. Diersen and Bruce J. Sherrick 
Estimates of  country-level loan default distributions are developed and used in a 
loan guarantee model to value the contingent liability of  USDA's  General Sales 
Manager (GSM) export credit guarantee portfolio. The results quantify the relation- 
ship between increasing guarantee coverage and the resulting actuarial liability to 
the government. Optimal coverage levels and optimal country-level allocations are 
determined for given policy objectives and coverage totals. Findings reveal that the 
government's allocation of  country guarantees is risk-inefficient; and guidance is 
provided for making risk-efficient allocations for any program size. 
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Introduction 
The USDA's  General Sales Manager (GSM) credit guarantee program is a key policy 
instrument used by the federal government in efforts to stimulate exports of U.S. agri- 
cultural commodities.  According to the U.S.  Code ofFederal Regulations (1998,1493.2), 
the stated purposes of the GSM programs are: "(a) to increase exports of U.S. agricul- 
tural exports; (b) to compete against foreign agricultural exports; [and] (c) to assist 
countries, particularly developing countries, in meeting their food and fiber needs.. . ." 
In practical terms, GSM programs are used to facilitate exports of  commodities to 
countries that are unable to obtain private financing due to credit risk, currency risk, 
political instability, or any other impediment to private financing. In addition to the 
intent to benefit producers of the exported commodity, the programs are also used to 
satisfy other political and market development motivations. The GSM-102 program can 
be used to guarantee loans up to three years in length, while the GSM-103 program 
guarantees loans up to 10 years in length. Both programs typically cover 98% of  the 
principal and interest due. The GSM-102 program dominates allocations, representing 
over 95%  of covered principal since inception. The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) 
is authorized to allocate over $5 billion per year in new guarantees across both programs. 
While the goals of  increasing exports, supporting development, and other political 
objectives underpin the loan guarantees, the existing programs have come under in- 
creased scrutiny because losses have often been high (at  one point reaching nearly 30%), 
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and the  total authorization seldom used. As a result, existing GSM programs have been 
simultaneously criticized for being too large and costly, and for failing to exhaust their 
available guarantee limits, with the implication that they must somehow be failing to 
generate the maximum benefits (minimum loss) for producers (taxpayers). 
Additionally, export credit programs have been criticized during World Trade Organ- 
ization (WTO) negotiations for their potential trade distortion effects, yet have been 
largely left in place in some form in most commodity exporting countries. The portion 
of the program's outlays in excess of fees recovered is recognized under commitments 
made in the WTO agreements as a subsidy under the notion that "subsidy costs 
approximate the  present value of the estimated net cash outflows at  the time the credit 
guarantees are disbursed by the lender" (CCC, 1998, p. 56). Thus, the calculation of the 
subsidy rate embedded in the guarantees is central in current trade debates, as is the 
need for more formal methods for accurately calculating effective subsidy levels in 
export credit programs for budget scoring purposes. Valuation of  the associated loan 
guarantees is  a necessary first step in assessing whether subsidies are  embedded in the 
GSM programs. 
The Credit Reform Act of 1990 requires that an  estimate of the actuarial value of the 
GSM guarantees be carried on the federal budget as a current liability, but it does not 
prescribe an approach for calculating its value. Consequently, widely divergent esti- 
mates have been formed. For example, the  U.S. General  Accounting Office (GAO), using 
an ad hoc scoring method, computed the costs of  the GSM-102 program at 25.1% of 
exposure, which contrasts sharply with the estimate of 7.4% provided at  the same time 
by the Executive Branch (U.S. GAO, 1994). Internally, the CCC recognized an annual 
"estimated liability of $43 million for anticipated claims on shipments made"; yet, at  the 
same time, the CCC carried accounting statement balances of unresolved claims paid 
of more than $2 billion (CCC, 1998, p. 17). 
Central to each of the above issues is the valuation of the contingent liability of the 
government associated with the issuance of export credit guarantees, and the design of 
efficient methods for the allocation of guarantees across countries with differing risk 
profiles. In  response, this study develops a method to recover complete measures of the 
underlying repayment capacity distributions for risky-country debt that combines 
information from the most important commercial sources of country risk ratings. These 
estimates are used in an economic model of guarantor activity to provide guidance for 
efficient allocations of guarantees across countries, for any  given program size, and with 
the  resulting actuarial costs computed. In  this context, inefficiency  reflects the  condition 
that higher coverage could be extended with the same expected costs, or that lower 
expected costs could be achieved at the same coverage levels--each  of which could be 
consistent with other policy objectives,  but fail the economic efficiency condition. Equiv- 
alently, for any given program size, efficiency can be considered as the lowest expected 
cost per dollar of guarantee coverage. Thus, to the extent that motivations other than 
efficiency guide allocations, the difference between the expected costs of  the actual 
allocation and the expected costs of an efficient allocation of the same coverage provides 
an estimate of the costs of  satisfying the non-efficiency motivations. 
The methods developed herein can be use to identify optimal allocations across 
countries that are  most risk- and cost-efficient,  and to provide estimates of the marginal 
costs of changing program coverage. The results consider alternative policy objectives 
and the associated optimal portfolio implications for each case. The findings of this study Diersen and Sherrick  GSM Export Credit Guarantees  153 
are  thus  helpful in providing evidence about the  actuarial  costs of the  existing programs 
for use in budget scoring and in trade debates as well. Moreover, the results are useful 
in improving the efficiency of this and other guarantee programs, and can help identify 
likely impacts of other potential program design changes. 
GSM Program Background 
The most visible GSM program activity occurs in the  form of new guarantees. Beginning 
with an authorized annual maximum, the CCC offers to guarantee debt to various 
countries for a wide array of eligible commodities. Fiscal-year totals of new activity are 
provided in table 1  for the period 1985-1997. As observed, new activity peaked in N 
1992 with just over $5 billion in guarantees. New activity dropped to below $3 billion 
as recently as N 1995 as a result of  unused allocations. In recent years, GSM-102 
activity has continued to guarantee $3 billion to $5 billion in credit. There has also been 
a shift toward use of the Supplier Credit Guarantee Program, which covers only 65% of 
the credit for a period up to 180 days. 
The only direct inflows to the CCC from the GSM programs come from guarantee fees 
charged to the exporter. Fee rates were historically set with some discretion in a range 
based on the terms of  guaranteed loans, the risk faced, and other factors. However, 
there was little variation across countries in actual fee rates, which averaged $0.61 per 
$100 covered for GSM-102 guarantees in 1997. Current policy sets  rates constant across 
countries except for the  term. The rates were last changed on October 1,2002,  and vary 
by term and repayment interval. Guarantee  fee revenue is simply the  fee rate times the 
amount guaranteed [more detail on the fee rate process is provided in the U.S. Code of 
Federal Regulations (1998,1493.70)l.  Also reported in table 1  are  the  annual claims paid 
by the CCC, which represent the primary cost of  the GSM programs.  Most claims 
represent only small fractions of the outstanding exposures to each recipient, but large 
claims occasionally occur as  well. (Iraq, for example, has not made any payments since 
the 1991 Gulf War, and is obviously not likely to make any further payments.) Once a 
claim is paid, the CCC seeks to recover as  much of that amount (termed "Paid Claims") 
as  possible from the  importer, its bank, or its government. "Paid claims" can thereafter 
be resolved by being repaid, rescheduled, or forgiven and written off. Until an agree- 
ment with the importing country is reached, "paid claims" are carried on the balance 
sheet of the CCC at  the full balance outstanding at  the time of default. This amount, as 
shown in the last column of table 1, exceeded $2 billion at the end of N 1997. 
Valuation Approaches 
The bulk of the  literature examining credit guarantees  utilizes actuarial-  or option-valu- 
ation methods to assess the  expected costs of a loan guarantee. In  examining alternative 
approaches for evaluating guarantee programs in the United States, Mody and Patro 
(1996) indicate that the U.S. GAO (1994)  method is merely a "rule-of-thumb" approach, 
developed for cases when the market price of  debt is unknown or cannot be observed. 
Therefore, it is not easily generalized to cases beyond the specific set of  countries 
examined. They identify the  use of contingent claims or option-valuation methods, which 
explicitly consider probabilistic information and associated default severities, as 
preferred over other methods which examine average default experience only. 154  April 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 1. Annual Guarantee Activity and  Claims Data, Fiscal Years 1985-1997 
New Guarantees  Guarantee  Paid Claims  Paid Claims 
Fiscal  Extended  Fees  During FY  Outstanding 
Year  ($ mil.)  ($ mil.)  ($ d.)  ($ mil.) 
1985  2,674  16  184  1,037 
1986  2,503  15  328  162 
1987  2,674  16  184  269 
1988  4,557  NA  287  225 
1989  3,218  NA  4  234 
1990  4,127  NA  17  194 
199 1  4,360  29  780  97 1 
1992  5,083  39  705  1,465 
1993  3,839  34  1,365  2,714 
1994  3,219  17  1,168  1,693 
1995  2,906  14  737  1,677 
1996  3,424  2 1  223  2,071 
1997  3,196  15  31  2,072 
Source: Annual Report of  the Commodity Credit Corporation (various years). 
While theoretically appealing, applications employing  contingent claims models (e.g., 
Black-Scholes style models) face a common problem of identifying the underlying asset 
distribution. Among the previous attempts, Schich (1997) uses two proxies for debt- 
servicing capacity as the underlying asset in export credit insurance, but is not able to 
fully identlfy an  underlying debt-servicing  capacity probability distribution. Dahl, Wilson, 
and Gustafson (1999) model GSM guarantees using a contingent valuation framework 
with the letter of credit as  the underlying asset. While their findings show the guarantee 
value to be about 15%  of the  value of guaranteed wheat exports to Pakistan, the methods 
are not easily generalized to a portfolio level. However, although both of  these studies 
utilize a theoretically appealing approach, neither is fully generalizeable because not all 
GSM recipient countries have debt which is actively traded on secondary markets. 
Yang and  Wilson (1996a)  model allocation decisions of the CCC and find the  quantity 
of credit extended to be negatively related to a measure of country risk and positively 
related to the imports for a given recipient. In a companion study, Yang and Wilson 
(1996b) also report a positive relation between GSM allocations and market share. They 
conclude that because larger allocations result in increased liability, the benefit of 
increased market share could potentially be more than offset by higher default costs. 
Proposed modifications to GSM programs have included the  use of "better risk assess- 
ment methods" in general, the limiting of  exposure to high-risk countries (U.S. GAO, 
1994),  and a movement toward region-wide allocations rather than county-specific  allo- 
cations. To offset costs, the GAO (U.S. GAO, 1995a) suggests that Congress eliminate 
the ban on fees over 1%  of exposure, and advocates risk-based fees be instituted by the 
CCC-but  provides no explicit mechanism for doing so. Other GAO suggestions include 
eliminating the  conflicting objectives of having exposure of at  least $5.5 billion per year 
and that recipients be creditworthy enough to repay such exposure, by using a broadened 
definition of eligibility (U.S. GAO, 1995b).  Internally, the Foreign Agricultural Senice 
is looking for ways to increase program activity levels while remaining attendant  to risk Diersen and Sherrick  GSM Export Credit Guarantees  155 
(Habenstreit, 1998).  Taken together, these studies, and calls for modification in existing 
methods, provide evidence of a strong need for improved valuation methods, with support 
for contingent valuation methods where possible. Improved valuation methods could 
improve allocations and result in cost saving, or alternatively, cover more exports and 
presumably generate additional surplus at  equivalent costs from efficient reallocation. 
Theoretical Valuation Model of 
Export Credit Guarantees 
It  has been shown that a loan guarantee can be valued equivalently to a put option with 
a strike price equal to the promised payment on the loan (Merton, 1977).  To develop this 
analogy in the present context, consider a guaranteed loan with promised  future 
payment of k at time T, and a random repayment capacity, c, available to service the 
loan. If the available repayment capacity realized is greater than the  required payment 
k, the borrower makes a payment equal to k and keeps the remainder (c - k). If, instead, 
the repayment flow is less than k, then the borrower defaults and pays only c, and the 
guarantor makes up the difference (k - c) as an indemnity payment to the holder of the 
guaranteed loan. The probability of default, or equivalently of the guarantor making a 
payment to the lender, is therefore equal to F(k), or the cumulative probability of the 
repayment capacity distribution at  k. The size of the guarantee payment is (k -  c) when- 
ever c c k, and zero otherwise. Thus, the resulting expected value of  the guarantee 
payment, V(k), is: 
V(k) =  f(c)(k -  c) dc, 
So 
where f  (c)  is the  probability density function of the  repayment capacity, and  other terms 
are as defined above. Under specific assumptions about the  form off (c), equation (1)  is 
equivalent to Merton's (1977) option formula.' 
Use of this approach in an  empirical setting requires the  estimation of the  repayment 
capacity distribution, f  (c12  As international finance markets have become relatively 
well developed, a number of  commercial vendors have begun offering a wide array of 
country risk-rating data products that  hold great promise for use in characterizing repay- 
ment capacity distributions. The commercially  most important sources of these products 
were purchased andlor collected from public sources as the basic data underlying the 
estimates that follow. Summary risk-rating scores and composite ratings data were 
collected on each of the individually reported countries in the GSM programs from 1985 
through 1996 from Institutional Investor, Euromoney, and International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG).3  The complete set of component data used in the construction of the 
Because the majority of the accumulated interest is also paid under the guarantees, there would be no effect of discount- 
ing and adding back the interest accumulated, and thus the effective discount factor is 1  and is omitted. 
''The U.S. GAO (1994)  assumes auniformparameterization  and constructs an  estimate by observing  single historic default 
frequencies. 
FAS historically used an internally developed method to assess country risk, but has switched to a commercial vendor 
(Moody's) to provide country risk ratings that are used to assess the repayment likelihoods of recipient countries. However, 
these are not provided directly in probabilistic form. Institutional Investor's  rating is a compilation of  ratings by various 
creditors. It is reported as  a single rating for each country on a scale from 0  (least creditworthy) to 100 (most creditworthy). 
Euromoney's rating is comprised of the summation of scores for different categories. It also ranges from 0  to 100.  ICRG's 
rating is a weighted average of 24 individual components in three broad risk categories. Its composite rating ranges from 
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ICRG composite rating was also purchased. In addition, historic GSM defaults by 
country by year were obtained from the CCC. 
Although the commercial ratings are intended to serve as a measure of the relative 
risks of default across countries, the scales of the ratings differ by source and none pur- 
port to be directly calibrated to probability of default measures. Several well-developed 
methods, commonly referred to as credit scoring models, exist for estimating the 
probability of default as  a function of the  ratings at  time of loan origination [for a review 
of alternate methods, see Turvey (1991),  or Saunders (1999)J.  The most commonly used 
approach employs a logistic regression model (logit) to relate the incidence of default to 
variables expected to influence the  likelihood of default. The logistic model accounts for 
the qualitative nature of the default data, accounts for the potential lack of calibration 
among the ratings data and default likelihoods, and results in forecasts with appropri- 
ate probabilistic properties. 
In the present case, alternate logit models were fit with each of the rating levels by 
country at  the  time guarantees  were extended. These rating levels were used to forecast 
the FY 1996 probability of default for guarantee recipients, e.  The estimated logit 
results were significant and similar between the  Institutional Investor and  Euromoney 
variables, and resulted in a slightly poorer fit when estimated using ICRG data. The 
general form of the estimated probability of  default from the rating R:  for country j, 
from source k, is: 
The estimated coefficients (standard errors) were a = -  1.274 (0.05721, and P  = -0.047 
(0.022) using Institutional Investor data; and a = -  1.340 (0.582), and  P = -0.032 (0.016) 
using Euromoney data. Each of the coefficients is significantly different from zero at  a 
0.05 level of significance. The goodness-of-fit measures are  similar when using either  the 
Institutional Investor or Euromoney ratings, and the coefficients  give similar forecasts, 
but with a slightly greater spread or discrimination among the rated countries when 
using the  Institutional  Investor ratings data. Thus, the remainder of the  results presented 
here utilize the Institutional Investor coefficients. 
Next, the severity of  GSM defaults was modeled as a function of  the individually 
reported ICRG rating components. To do so, observed default magnitudes were first 
standardized using a Box-Cox transformation to account for disparity of exposure levels 
and nomormality. The standardized severity was modeled as a linear function of four 
statistically significant ICRG components: economic expectations  vs. reality (EER), 
quality of the bureaucracy (QOB),  racial and nationality tensions (RNT), and foreign 
trade collections experience (FCR) over the same time period as the probability-of- 
default model. The estimated relationship has an  R2  = 0.63 and, with the exception of 
the intercept, the coefficients on each variable are significant at a 0.05 level with 
the expected signs. The estimated coefficients (standard errors) are: a = -0.257 (0.857), 
PEER = 0.419 (0.111), PgoB  = -0.616 (0.229), Pm  = -0.368 (0.122), and Pm  = -0.482 
(0.199).  ICRG component levels were then used to forecast the standardized severity for 
guarantee recipients in N 1996, which was then converted back to the base units to 
obtain country-level forecasts of the conditional mean of the repayment capacity distri- 
butions in the event a default occurs, Cjd. Diersen and Sherrick  GSM Export Credit Guarantees  157 
Taken together, the estimated probability of default and conditional mean in cases 
of default can be used to identify a complete repayment capacity distribution for each 
country. The cumulative probability of the repayment capacity distribution evaluated 
at  the exposure level for recipient j is specified as: 
where kj is the exposure or guarantee level for recipient j, and f  (c,) is its unknown repay- 
ment capacity distribution. Likewise, the forecast of the conditional mean is related to 
the unknown repayment capacity distribution because: 
Thus, equations (3) and (4) together permit identification of  recipient j's  repayment 
capacity. 
Iff (c) is parameterized as  a beta distribution with upper bound u, the solution for 
recipient j is: 
where a,  b, and u are greater than zero, and B(a, b) is the beta f~nction.~  The distribu- 
tion is easily standardized to a probability distribution by substituting z = clu. This 
allows for a characterization in either dollars or probability space. The value c = klu is 
the  point on the distribution that partitions the probability of default from nondefault, 
or equivalently, the strike price in an option pricing context. 
The parameters of the  corresponding beta distributions  were estimated for each of the 
individual countries identified in table 2, with coverage representing over 95%  of the 
GSM  program^.^ Other methods for determining the repayment capacity distributions, 
including those currently used by FAS or in commercially  available credit-scoring pack- 
ages, could likewise be used if preferred, but this approach has the benefits of making 
greater use of available risk-rating information and retaining probabilistic information. 
In  contrast to the GAO approach using purely subjective parameterization, this approach 
estimates the parameters using the commercially most important set of risk forecasts 
available and corresponding actual historic default measures. 
Substituting  the  beta distribution into the  valuation formula in (1)  and rearranging, 
the guarantee value equals: 
V,(k la, b, u) = kIx(a,  b) - u B(a 
+
 l'  b, lX(a  + 1,  b), 
B(a,  b) 
The beta distribution was selected for flexibility and ease of interpretation. See Zellner (1971),  and Patel, Kapadia, and 
Owen (19761,  for properties and analytic descriptions of the beta distribution. Other two-parameter distributions, bounded 
at  zero, could also have  been selected, but the results are not likely to be sensitive  to the choice. Equations (3) and (4)  exactly 
identify the two parameters of the beta distribution; however, the analytic solution is intractable. Thus, a numeric search 
coded in  LispStat was used to solve for the parameters listed in  table 2. 
The CCC reports a few other countries aggregated into regions. Complete country-specific results of the  beta distribution 
estimates are available from the authors upon request. 158  April2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 2. Exposure and Guarantee Values for FY  1996 GSM  Recipient Countries 
Optimal  Guarantee  Exposure 
Guarantee  Exposure  Value "  Share (ES,) 
Recipient  ($9  ($1  (96) 
Algeria  850,931,486  6,441,075  11.3 
Brazil  129,004,690  26,705  1.7 
Egypt  211,998,945  44,625  2.8 
Indonesia  237,521,815  582,639  3.2 
Jordan  53,106,993  8,572  0.7 
South Korea  355,714,139  16,008  4.7 
Mexico  3,839,226,405  605,474  51.1 
Morocco  409,248,707  50,983  5.4 
Pakistan  748,127,835  238,954  10.0 
Romania  127,915,154  162,816  1.7 
Russia  47,047,600  511,319  0.6 
Sri Lanka  92,856,140  500,504  1.2 
Tunisia  226,410,946  170,857  3.0 
Turkey  184,425,536  119,638  2.5 
Risk  Fee 
Share (RS,)  Equivalent 
(%)  ($9 
67.9  0.757 
0.3  0.021 
0.5  0.021 
6.1  0.245 
0.1  0.016 
0.2  0.005 
6.4  0.016 
0.5  0.012 
2.5  0.032 
1.7  0.127 
5.4  1.087 
5.3  0.539 
1.8  0.075 
1.3  0.065 
Total  $7,513,536,390  $9,480,168  100%  100% 
" The guarantee is valued for the actual exposure level. 
The fee equivalent reflects the actuarial value of the guarantee value per $100  of exposure at  the actual size. 
where IJa,  b)  is the  value of the standardized beta cumulative distribution function, with 
x  = klu (for demonstration of this result, refer to the appendix). Using this expression, 
the corresponding guarantee values are calculated and shown in table 2 along with the 
corresponding exposure levels for the countries individually reported by the CCC. 
Also presented in table 2 are the fractions of the total portfolio exposure shares by 
country (ES,) and the fractions of the total guarantee liability or risk shares (RS,) for 
each country. The exposure share is the  fraction of the total guarantee volume committed 
to a particular country. It is largest for Mexico at over 50% and smallest for Russia at 
less than 1%.  However, the risk share, or equivalently the fraction of the implied total 
liability represented by a country, can be quite different. For example, Algeria has a 
relative volume of only 11%  (exposure share) of the portfolio, yet its relative portion of 
the contingent cost is largest at  68%  (risk share).  The guarantee  values, as  a percentage 
of  exposure by country, can be compared to the guarantee fees charged by the CCC. 
These actuarial fee equivalents, reported in table 2, vary widely across countries. The 
actuarial fee equivalent is the "fair" or average rate which would need to be charged to 
cover the expected loss for that specific country's case. Note that  most of the actuarially 
fair fees for exposure are less than the average rate charged by the CCC of  approxi- 
mately $0.61 per $100 coverage during the year used in this example. Thus, in the cases 
where the actual rates charged are greater than the expected costs, there is no implied 
~ubsidy.~  If the  fee rates charged were less than the expected costs, the differences could 
be viewed as  a form of subsidized insurance that could be subject to additional scrutiny 
under WTO rules. 
In the vernacular of  the WTO  agreements,  this result would argue that there would be no contribution under the amber 
box and no charge against the allowable maximum subsidy (AMS)  account from the guarantee in this case. Diersen and Sherrick  GSM Export Credit Guarantees  159 
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Figure 1. Guarantee program components and optimal exposure level, 
guarantee value, probability of default, fee revenue, and bonus levels 
Framework to Evaluate Optimal Exposure 
Determination of the conditions which represent "optimal" exposure requires that the 
costs and benefits of differing guarantee activities be ascertained. To evaluate optimal 
exposure, first consider a guarantor with a single recipient country. The guarantor's 
preferred position depends on the additionality and slippage of the guarantee program, 
and the  impact of changes in prices of commodities sold through non-program channels. 
For convenience, refer to the net economic benefit per dollar guaranteed as the "bonus 
rate," or d. The total bonus, analogous to a consumer and producer surplus measure, is 
the bonus rate, d,  times exposure or coverage volume, k. Figure 1  depicts the relation- 
ships among the total bonus, the guarantee value, fee revenue, marginal guarantee 
value, and probability of default. Exposure is on the  horizontal axis, and the  probability 
of default is  on the  vertical axis along with the associated dollar values of the guarantee, 
bonus, and fees. The total bonus is  shown as the upper straight line with a slope, in this 
example set to 0.6. The lower of the curved lines represents the value of a guarantee as 
a function of its exposure, V(k),  which increases at an increasing rate as the coverage 
(strike  price) increases. 
In the single-country case, the guarantor's choice variables are the fee rate and 
exposure level to set for the recipient. For convenience, assume the fee rate,  m, is set 
constant at  some fraction of the exposure level, and is less than the bonus rate. The fee 
revenue, equal to m *k, is depicted by the lower straight line in figure 1, with a slope of 
0.2 in this example. For given fee and bonus rates, the choice of  optimal guarantee 
coverage can be reduced to the choice of guarantee coverage amount. 
Importantly, different policy objectives lead to different outcomes under a fmed fee 
rate. If the objective of the guarantor were to maximize net fee revenue, the guarantor 
would set the exposure at  point A in figure 1, where the  marginal fee revenue equals the 160  April 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
marginal cost of the guarantee. At point A, the slope of the guarantee value equals 0.2, 
and that exposure level results in the maximum expected profit from fees. Point A also 
maximizes guarantee program benefits in the absence of any bonus. If the objective were 
instead to maximize the net bonus from the program, the guarantor would choose 
exposure at  point C in figure 1. At C, the marginal cost associated with the guarantee 
value equals the marginal bonus of 0.6, and the guarantor would operate at  an expected 
cost that exceeds fee revenues. Such behavior would maximize the welfare distributed 
back to producers, less any actuarial costs of  the guarantees. This case would require 
a subsidy at the program level using a mechanism similar to that currently employed 
in the GSM programs. Finally, if the objective were to maximize the bonus subject to 
operating at the breakeven point with regard to fee revenue and expected cost, the 
guarantor would operate at B. At point B, the fee revenue equals the expected cost or 
guarantee value. Point B is also equivalent to the solution a private supplier would 
reach in a competitive market. 
For given fee and bonus rates, there is a unique solution for the single-country case. 
Changing either the fee or bonus rate does not change the nature of  the optimal 
solutions, but does affect their locations. Thus, by changing the fee rate (bonus rate), a 
set of points can be found for which the slope of  the guarantee value equals the fee rate 
(bonus rate) across exposure levels. Another set of  points exists where the guarantee 
value equals fee revenue across exposure levels. These facts are useful in the construc- 
tion of  risk-efficient  portfolios across multiple countries. 
Regardless of  the guarantor's objective, the marginal guarantee value is needed to 
determine the optimal exposure level. From the general guarantee valuation formula 
in equation (I),  it can be shown that the partial derivative of  V(k) with respect to k 
reduces to F(k), the cumulative distribution function at k. Similarly, if the repayment 
capacity follows a beta distribution, then from equation (6): 
la, b, u) 
= Ik(a,  b). 
ak 
In the general case, a guarantor has multiple potential guarantee recipients compris- 
ing a portfolio. To be efficient, a guarantor would seek to extend as many guarantees as 
possible for a given level of liability. The efficient allocation objective function for a 
guarantor is therefore denoted by: 
subject to the given liability constraint, where dj  is the bonus rate for country  j, kj  is the 
exposure to country  j, mj is the fee rate for country  j, and V(kj) is the guarantee value 
for country j. Assuming the existence of  single fee and bonus rates for each guarantee 
recipient, m and d respectively, the first-order conditions for the guarantor are: 
dV.(k) 
n' =d+m  - '=d d  +m-F.(k.)  =0,  Vrecipientsj. 
dk  J  J 
The second-order condition assuring a maximum is satisfied because n" = -  fj(kj),  which 
is strictly negative. Diersen and Sherrick  GSM Export Credit Guarantees  16 1 
The efficient set of  portfolios can be located in total guarantee value-total exposure 
space as  the envelope of solutions  to the problem of maximizing exposure for every given 
guarantee value, permitting optimal reallocation of country exposure within each port- 
folio. In other words, the efficient allocation at  a given total liability rate is found, and 
then the total liability incrementally increased and resolved, and so on, to trace out the 
set of  points defining the efficient frontier. 
To describe the guarantee portfolio at a point on the frontier, define total exposure, 
TE, as the sum of  exposure across recipients, or: 
and define guarantee liability, GL, as  the sum of the guarantee values across recipients, 
or: 
Political preference functions dictate the acceptable tradeoff between total exposure 
and guarantee liability. These preference functions are assumed to increase in the 
directions  of higher total exposure and of lower guarantee liability. For a given objective, 
the portfolio frontier is obtained by mapping points where optimal total exposure is 
measured against its corresponding guarantee liability. For example, if the objective is 
to maximize fee profits, then there is a set of  optimal outcomes corresponding to any 
given fee rate. The frontier thus constructed gives the most cost-effective combination 
of  total exposure and guarantee liability associated with different fee rates. The point 
of  tangency between the frontier and the political preference functions then identifies 
the optimal portfolio. 
Identification of Country Allocations 
at Points on the Efficient Frontier 
The exposure level for a given country on the risk-efficient frontier can be identified by 
finding the solution to the inverse of  the cumulative distribution function at a given 
revenue rate. Once the optimal exposure level is known, the guarantee value for that 
exposure level is computed. The process is repeated for differing levels of the cumulative 
probability of  the repayment capacity across countries, and the risk-efficient frontier of 
allocations identified. 
To demonstrate, consider a revenue rate equal to 1%  of  the exposure from a 0.5% fee 
rate, and a 0.5% bonus rate, under an objective to maximize total net revenue (note, this 
set of  values was chosen to generate an efficient allocation example that is of  similar, 
but slightly lower exposure than the actual case). To maximize total net revenue, the 
guarantor would identify the exposure levels such that the cumulative probability of 
default for each country equals 1%.  Under this example set of  conditions, the resulting 
optimal exposure levels are found for each country at their respective inverse cumula- 
tive default functions at 1%  default probabilities. The results for the different countries 
are shown in table 3, along with the corresponding guarantee values. For this set of 
efficient allocations, each country has the same probability of  the loan default, but the 
costs of  the guarantees and exposure levels differ across countries. 162  April 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 3. Portfolio on  Risk-Efficient Frontier with 1%  Revenue Rate 
Optimal  Guarantee  Exposure  Risk  Fee 
Guarantee  Exposure  Value  Share (ES,)  Share (RS,)  Equivalent 















Total  $7,261,767,755  $1,087,398  100%  100% 
On the risk-efficient frontier presented in table 3, Algeria has an optimal exposure 
level of  $697 million. Fee revenue equals $3.4 million with expected bonus of $3.4 million. 
The expected cost of  the guarantee is $486,039. Thus, the net fee revenue (fee revenue 
less expected cost) would be slightly less than $3 million. Consider also the fee equivalent 
amounts in the last column of  table 3. The fee equivalent is the ratio of  the guarantee 
value to the optimal exposure, and reflects the dollar cost per $100 of  exposure. While 
under the assumed fee rate Algeria would pay $0.50 for every $100 of  exposure, the 
coverage has an expected cost of  only $0.07 for every $100 of  exposure. 
Interestingly, in comparing tables 2 and 3, the relative allocations follow a pattern 
that generally corresponds to the actual allocations, with reductions to country alloca- 
tions for which the fee equivalents under the actual allocations were higher. The efficient, 
and slightly smaller reallocations presented in table 3 result in aggregate guarantee 
values that drop by about $8.4 million on a reduction in guarantee exposure of  about 
$252 million, or an average rate on the incremental guarantees of just over 3.3%. 
Comparing the different countries, the exposure and risk shares (ES, and RS,) vary 
substantially, but are risk-efficient by  construction (i.e., no greater coverage at the 
expected cost is possible, or equivalently, no lower expected cost at the given coverage 
is possible). Mexico has the largest exposure share at over 50%. At the same time, Algeria 
has the largest share of  the risk in terms of  the value of  its guarantee relative to guar- 
antee liability, at slightly less than 45%. These results contrast with those found by the 
U.S. GAO (1995a), which indicate Russia's large share of  the GSM risk is undesirable 
in a portfolio context. However, portfolios on the frontier share the feature that all 
guarantee recipients represent an equivalent cost at  the margin-i.e.,  for an additional 
dollar of exposure, the expected guarantee liability is equal, regardless of  the recipient. 
Once an efficient portfolio is obtained, the given rate can be  changed and other 
efficient portfolios identified. Because the rates equal the slope of  the cumulative 
distribution function  of the  repayment capacity for each country, the slope of the frontier Diersen and Sherrick  GSM Export Credit Guarantees  163 
Guarantee Liability 
Figure 2. Efficient guarantee  portfolio frontier 
equals the fee rate at  each point. Hence, the frontier also shows the effects on the opti- 
mal portfolio for different fee rates. If the fee rate is lower, for instance as a result of  a 
political mandate, then the optimal portfolio would be smaller in terms of total exposure 
and guarantee liability. If higher fee rates could be charged, then a larger total exposure 
level could be obtained while remaining risk-efficient. Applied differently, the frontier 
relationship can be used to set the fee rate (or bonus rate) necessary to be optimal if the 
guarantor or regulators mandated a specific total exposure level. Guarantee liability is 
small for low revenue rates, reflecting the low likelihood of any guarantee payments for 
the corresponding exposure. As the revenue rate or slope increases, total exposure 
increases at a constant rate, while guarantee liability increases at an increasing rate. 
At the highest revenue rates, the marginal cost of  extending additional guarantees 
approaches one-a  fact that also helps in understanding the sensitivity of the fee rates 
to size of exposure. 
The risk-efficient  frontier, shown in figure 2, has the shape expected of a combination 
of  option values. Because all the guarantees are convex in exposure, their weighted 
average, inverted, is necessarily concave. Evident in the graph is the relation whereby 
guarantee liability (GL)  approaches zero as total exposure (TE) decreases. The slope 
approaches one as TE increases (although the differing scales on the axes in figure 2 
somewhat mask that relationship). All possible portfolios are located on or below this 
frontier with either a higher guarantee liability or lower total exposure than the port- 
folios on the fr~ntier.~ 
The data from actual GSM  country allocations in 1996 were also examined using equation (6) to assess the efficiency of 
that year's allocation. The specific allocation  was dominated by a section  of the efficient  frontier which would have permitted 
approximately $38 million additional guarantee volume at the same expected loss, or a reduction of  the expected loss of 
approximately $1.4 million at the same total coverage from optimal reallocation of  guarantees in the portfolio. An expansion 
path can also be constructed by varying the fee rates and computing  efficient portfolio allocations at each level. Importantly, 
the results of  this exercise demonstrate that the risk shares are the same as the exposure shares in this case--a  feature 
identified as desirable by the U.S.  GAO (1995a),  although risk-efficiency was not the GAO's motivation for suggesting that 
this condition would be preferred. Results of  this exercise are available from the authors upon request. 164  April 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Summary and  Conclusions 
This study uses the commercially most important sources of  country risk-rating data to 
develop estimates of measures of the repayment capacity distributions for countries in 
the GSM portfolio, and analyzes the expected costs and risk efficiency of alternative coun- 
try allocations. The methods demonstrated permit a guarantor to quantify the tradeoff 
between the exposure and liability of  guarantees in a portfolio. The results show that a 
guarantor seeking to maximize either net fee or bonus revenue would do so by extending 
guarantees whereby the marginalvalue of guarantees is equated across recipients. Arisk- 
efficient frontier for guarantee portfolios will result where the cost-effective exposure 
levels depend on the available fee or bonus rates, and the marginal cost of  guarantees is 
equated across countries. A guarantor may choose to maximize fee revenue in excess of 
expected default costs, or maximize the total bonus net of expected default costs, or pursue 
the equivalent of a private guarantor's objective. Regardless of choice, the methods provide 
a means of  identifying the optimal portfolio for the particular objective pursued. 
Direct applications include use to demonstrate subsidy levels embedded in the govern- 
mentally issued guarantees. As shown in the evaluation, the implied actuarial costs were, 
in aggregate,  slightly below the fee rates being charged, indicating  that no trade subsidies 
were created through the program. As conditions change (either country risks, or fee 
rates), the methods provide more easily calculated and defended estimates of  subsidy 
levels and other information needed for budget scoring and trade debate purposes. 
Both internal and external changes  to the guarantee programs would impact the risk- 
efficient portfolio composition. Different fee and/or bonus rates likewise imply that 
different portfolios on the efficient frontier would be optimal. And, achieving different 
levels of  total exposure may require a different fee rate, or an acceptance of  losses on 
fees if other benefits are considered. In any case, the methods herein could also assist 
in assessing the impact of  other changes in program design such as changing the sub- 
ordination method or deductible level~.~ 
Regardless of the guarantor's objective or constraints, rational methods exist to man- 
age guarantees and portfolios in a risk-efficient manner. Hence, the analysis is part of 
a larger scope of  problems associated with managing credit guarantee programs and 
overall governmental budget exposure. 
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Appendix: 
Derivation of Text Equation (6), 
Guarantee Value Form 
Let z =  CIU.  Then  the unknown repayment capacity distribution can be written as: 
The  density includes the  beta function  defined as: 
The  standardized beta density function is unimodal if  a,  b > 0,  and uniform  if  a = b = 1. The  incomplete 
beta function is defined as: 
where a,  b > 0,  and 0 <  x  < 1. The  incomplete beta function ratio is defined as: 
which is also equivalent to the beta cumulative distribution function.  These definitions allow the 
guarantee value defined for x  = k lu  to be restated as: 166  April 2005  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
V(x)  =  "  f(z)(x  -z)dz  = xF(z) -  "zf(z)dz  = xI,(a, b)  - 
I0  I0 
= xI,(a, b)  - -  I'za(l -z)~-'~z  = xI%(a,  b) - -  Bz(a  + 1,b) 
B(a,  b)  o  B(a,  b) 
= xI,(a, b)  - B(a 
+
 '9 b,  I%(U  + 1, b). 
B(a,  b) 
Substituting  k/u  forx and resealing the density values by u results in: 
k  V(k)  = -&(a, b)u - B(a  + 1, b)  I,(a + 1,  b)u. 
u  B(a,  b) 
Canceling the u terms in the first part results in the reduced form given by text equation (6). 